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Abstract  
The multiplicity of forms of health-related knowledge, including biomedical 
knowledge, lay knowledge, and critical constructionist knowledge, raises 
challenges for health researchers. On one hand, there is a demand for a 
pluralist acceptance of the variety of health-related knowledge. On the other, 
the need to improve health calls for action, and thus for choices between 
opposing forms of knowledge. The present article proposes a pragmatist 
approach to this epistemological problem. According to pragmatism, 
knowledge is a tool for action and as such it should be evaluated according to 
whether it serves the desired interests. We identify implications for research 
methodology and the choice of research goals.  
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Working in the context of complex real-world health problems, health 
psychologists encounter the challenge of a multiplicity of conflicting forms of 
knowledge. Take an example of working to prevent HIV transmission in the 
context of commercial sex (e.g. Campbell, 2003). Biomedical knowledge 
about risk factors and transmission routes suggests promoting condoms to 
sex workers. After some qualitative interviewing, it emerges that, according to 
local knowledge, condoms are for casual sexual relationships and thus the 
absence of condoms in a regular relationship signals closeness and trust. In 
this situation, emphasising the medical risks of commercial sex may actually 
exacerbate the risks in the sexual relationships with regular partners. Finally, 
after some critical reflection, stimulated by theoretical knowledge of ‘victim 
blaming’ and stigmatisation, a researcher might question the ideological 
assumptions and social effects of targeting the sex workers rather than their 
clients. In this example we see three forms of knowledge collide, with each 
indicating a different intervention. How should health psychologists judge the 
value of each form of knowledge?  
 
The epistemological assumptions of health psychology research have 
traditionally been framed as a choice between the realism of ‘mainstream’ 
health psychology and constructionism, often associated with ‘critical health 
psychology’ (e.g. Crossley, 2000a). Neither of these approaches has 
convincingly provided the right answer to health psychology’s epistemological 
questions (Marks, 2002). On one hand, the immediacy of suffering and 
inequality call for effective action and improved health outcomes, traditionally 
associated with a realist epistemology. On the other hand, health issues are 
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replete with political and moral dimensions and thus call for nuanced 
constructionist critique (Yardley & Murray, 2003). Realism tends to prioritise a 
single form of knowledge as ‘true’, thus being insensitive to alternative forms 
of knowledge, while the relativism associated with constructionism makes it 
difficult to give definitive recommendations for effective action. Is it possible 
for research to be pluralist about knowledge, but at the same time non-
relativist and promote positive social action?  
 
In the interest of contributing to the ongoing debate about the philosophy, 
scope, values and methodologies of health psychology (Crossley, 2000a; 
Hepworth, 2006; Marks, 2002; Murray & Campbell, 2003; Prilleltensky, 2003), 
this article introduces a pragmatist philosophical perspective. Pragmatism, we 
shall argue, avoids the problems of realism and relativism and enables both 
critique and action. 
The problem of knowledge in health research  
Awareness of the plurality of knowledge is part of the ‘postmodern condition’ 
(Lyotard,1984), in which ‘Grand Narratives’ are no longer convincing. The 
juxtaposition, in the global age, of multiple contrasting beliefs undermines our 
confidence that Science, Religion or Philosophy holds the key to that which is 
True or Good. Historical studies, such as Foucault’s (1967) pioneering work 
on scientific discourses of mental illness, have shown the power-laden effects 
of highly contingent, yet so-called scientific, knowledge. Developing this 
approach, constructionist researchers have questioned the dominance of 
biomedical discourses (e.g., Crossley, 2000a), the governmentality of health 
promotion policies and messages (e.g., Sykes, Willig & Marks, 2004), and the 
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particular ways in which research methods such as randomised controlled 
trials and systematic reviews construct knowledge (Moreira, 2007). Such 
questioning has been complemented by alternative positive programmes of 
research, including the development of qualitative research methods (Camic, 
Rhodes & Yardley, 2003a), and research interests in other knowledges, such 
as community and service user perspectives (Foster, 2007; Fryer & Fagan, 
2003).  
 
However, the constructionist perspective has itself been subjected to critique 
(Murray & Campbell, 2003; Hepworth, 2006). Two major charges are of 
particular relevance here.  Firstly, a constructionist position, which claims that 
all knowledge is constructed from a particular ideological, social or personal 
position, undermines claims that any one of these constructions is definitively 
morally or epistemologically superior to another. Constructionism’s critics 
argue that such relativism is not defensible for a morally responsible science. 
It is argued that local knowledge is sometimes simply wrong or even 
oppressive (Prior, 2003). In refusing to adjudicate between ‘local truths’, critics 
argue, constructionism accepts oppressive or false beliefs, and fosters 
individualism and fragmentation (Ratner, 2006). Secondly, constructionism is 
criticised for neglecting social action and positive programmes for intervention 
(Murray & Campbell, 2003). Analysis of discourses plays a crucial critical role 
in revealing the workings of power in society, but such analyses rarely lead to 
specific implications for health-enhancing action (though see Willig, 1999, for 
an exception). The pressing challenge for critical health psychology, 
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according to Prilleltensky (2003, p.2), is ‘to offer alternative practices that go 
beyond the status quo and its critique’.  
 
Pragmatism, we shall suggest, takes us beyond the realism-constructionism 
divide, providing a productive approach to evaluating health-related 
knowledge. Pragmatism acknowledges the plurality of knowledges and 
provides for critical analysis, but, by focusing on the purposes and 
consequences of knowledge, allows for non-relativist positive social action. 
We first outline the pragmatist perspective and then turn to consider some of 
the consequences of pragmatism for health research. 
 
Pragmatism: Knowledge as a tool for action 
Pragmatism originated over a century ago with the American philosophers 
Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey and George Herbert 
Mead. Unlike realism, pragmatism does not rest upon ambitious claims about 
knowledge reflecting an underlying reality. Unlike idealism, it rejects the idea 
that the mind is the basis of knowledge, and directly opposed to rationalism, it 
disagrees that abstract rationality is the path to reliable knowledge. For 
pragmatism, it is practical activity that is the bedrock and the test of 
knowledge. Knowledge is judged according to its consequences in action. 
Recently there has been a surge of interest in pragmatism, in philosophy 
(Kloppenberg, 1996), social theory (Baert, 2004), law (Posner, 2003), medical 
ethics (Hester, 2003), education (Biesta, 2007), and public administration 
(Shields, 2003), but as yet, it has had little impact in psychology or in health-
related research.  
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The pragmatist approach to the problem of knowledge is to change the 
question that we ask about knowledge. Instead of asking ‘Does this 
knowledge accurately reflect the underlying reality?’ the question becomes 
‘Does this knowledge serve our purposes?’ (Rorty, 1999). The roots of this 
shift lie in a critique of the Platonic idea of Truth. According to Plato, beyond 
our flawed human perceptions, there exists an almost heavenly and timeless 
realm of ‘ideal forms’ which comprise Truth. In Plato’s allegory of the cave, 
human perceptions are akin to mere shadows on a wall, cast by the real ideal 
forms outside the cave. This Platonic conception of Truth was carried forward 
by philosophers such as Descartes (Gillespie, 2006), and underlies 
contemporary variants of realism. Realism adheres to a correspondence 
theory of truth, maintaining that there is a reality ‘behind’ appearances, and 
that true knowledge is knowledge which corresponds to that reality.  
 
Pragmatism strongly rejects the correspondence theory of truth. For 
pragmatists, knowledge is not a representation of reality or a ‘mirror of nature’ 
(Rorty, 1981). Rather, it is a tool for action. Rather than mirroring reality, 
knowledge mediates our relation to the physical and social world. Pragmatists 
argue that there is nothing extra to be gained by positing a reality ‘behind’ 
appearances and worrying about whether one’s statements represent that 
reality (Rorty, 1999). Lay people and scientists alike construct knowledge in 
the context of action: knowledge guides action and action feeds back into 
knowledge construction. Thus, for pragmatists, the only sensible yardstick by 
which to judge a piece of knowledge is whether that knowledge is useful for a 
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given interest. A hammer is useful for striking nails just as knowledge of 
antibiotics is useful for dealing with bacterial infections, and knowledge about 
complementary medicine is useful in cultivating a feeling of wellbeing. None of 
these tools can be said to ‘better reflect an underlying reality’, rather, each 
tool serves its particular purpose.  
 
Rorty (1998, p.48) captures the radical novelty of the pragmatist approach 
when, in his characteristically provocative way, he states that our vocabularies 
and concepts ‘have no more of a representational relation to an intrinsic 
nature of things than does the anteater’s snout’. The anteater’s snout is an 
adaptation to its environment, which mediates between the anteater’s desire 
for ants and the existence of ants in hard to reach places. The ‘goodness’ of 
the snout can be judged accordingly. Just as the anteater’s snout is not a 
mirror of ants in hard-to-reach places, human knowledge of horticulture and 
animal husbandry is not a mirror of plants and animals. It is a purpose-driven 
mediator between the human desire for food and the world as we find it. Its 
usefulness is judged, not by whether it ‘mirrors’ reality, but by whether it 
successfully enables humans to achieve their various individual and collective 
interests.  
 
Pragmatism’s focus on usefulness is sometimes interpreted (and criticised) as 
narrow utilitarianism – a position that knowledge should serve very practical 
purposes, or should enable the smooth functioning of society. However, this is 
misleading. While one might be able to reduce the anteater’s use of a snout to 
reproduction, human interests are much more varied, and may extend from 
 10 
disturbing the smooth functioning of society to controlling nature, from poetry 
to convincing consumers to purchase cigarettes, and, importantly, from 
individual interests to collective interests. Indeed, it is the recognition of the 
great variety of human interests which makes pragmatism pluralistic (James, 
1977).  
 
The rejection of reality behind appearance does not leave pragmatism in a 
relativist quagmire. The existence of activity – mundane here-and-now 
practical action – is undeniable. While correspondence theories of truth 
prioritise reference to reality, considering activity and experience as imperfect 
reflections of this reality, pragmatism inverts this hierarchy, placing human 
activity as primary, and considering talk of reality ‘behind’ experience as 
speculative, vague and untrustworthy. Thus, the criteria for judging good 
knowledge are in whether it works to solve the problems of everyday action.  
 
Pragmatism is pluralist (like constructionism), in that it accepts the variety of 
competing interests and forms of knowledge. Accordingly, it is also critical, in 
that its focus on the interests served by knowledge invite questioning of 
whose interests are being served. However, it is non-relativist, in that 
knowledge can be evaluated by reference to its ability to facilitate successful 
action. It is action-oriented, in that everyday problems and actions are the 
primary reality, and the test of our knowledge.  
 
Thus far, we have outlined the epistemological position of pragmatism 
regarding the nature of knowledge. But the discussion has been abstract, 
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focusing on assumptions rather than consequences, and hence not, in fact, 
pragmatist. We now turn to putting pragmatism to its own test of having 
consequences for action, considering its consequences for the choice of 
research methods, and the choice of interests to pursue.  
 
Choosing research methods: Hierarchy of evidence or 
diversity of interests? 
Health psychologists are engaged in a wide range of knowledge-making 
practices, including randomised controlled trials (RCTs), surveys, narrative 
analysis, discourse analysis, action research and theoretical work, among 
others. Researchers in these different traditions argue over the relative merits 
of their approaches, some arguing for the importance of prediction and 
control, while others argue for the value of understanding meanings. 
Arguments between these different approaches are implicitly predicated on 
the non-pragmatist question: Which form of knowledge-making brings us 
closest to the ‘Truth’?  
 
The dominant way to answer this question has been to propose a ‘hierarchy 
of evidence’ to order the different methods (e.g., Evans, 2003; Harris et al., 
2001). The ‘hierarchy of evidence’ tells us that systematic reviews of RCTs 
are the most valuable forms of evidence, followed by individual RCTs, 
uncontrolled studies, cohort studies, descriptive and case studies. This 
hierarchy prioritises experimental, quantitative methods, and de-legitimises 
case studies or qualitative methods. The hierarchy has been critiqued in 
 12 
critical health literature, on the basis that RCTs fail to elucidate the processes 
through which outcomes were produced (Clark et al., 2007; MacPhail & 
Campbell, 1999), and are insensitive in instances of complex, multiply-
determined, socially-situated health issues (Clark et al., 2007; van de Ven and 
Aggleton, 1999).  
 
A pragmatist approach adds a helpful frame to such critiques, arguing that 
there is no absolutely ‘best’ method, but each method is good at achieving 
particular ends (Baert, 2004; Camic, Rhodes & Yardley, 2003b). To make a 
judgement about the relative merits of the diverse knowledge-making 
practices, a pragmatist would first ask: In relation to which interests are we 
judging these practices?  
 
RCTs are particularly suitable for determining which of a limited number of 
interventions is most effective at producing a pre-determined health outcome 
within a specific stable context. They answer to scientific interests in 
comparing the effects of different pharmacological treatments, or other 
clearly-defined interventions, and to health professionals’ interests in choosing 
between treatments. RCTs are excellent means of achieving these particular 
ends, but these are not the only ends that may be served by health research. 
Indeed, to place RCTs at the top of the hierarchy may be to prioritise certain 
interests, and thus, an exercise of power, rather than a reflection of an 
objective hierarchy among methods.  
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The expansion of ‘Evidence-Based’ approaches, with their hierarchies of 
evidence, beyond medicine, to the now popular notion of ‘Evidence-Based 
Policy’ points to a key interest served by such hierarchies: the interest of 
policymakers and managers in being able to justify their decisions (Dobrow et 
al., 2004). Claims about the evidence-base for the allocation of scarce 
resources lend decisions the rhetorical power of accountability, transparency 
and fairness. Perhaps the usefulness of RCTs for making justifiable policy 
decisions is the reason for their being placed at the top of the hierarchy.   
 
This is not to suggest that research ought never to serve such managerial 
interests. But it is to be more specific about what interests RCTs serve. 
Presenting RCTs as the ‘gold standard’ for research obstructs the pursuit of 
alternative interests, and de-legitimises the best methods for meeting these 
alternative interests. We will consider three alternative interests: knowledge 
for taking care of oneself, knowledge for intervention design, and knowledge 
for cultural critique. 
 
Knowledge for taking care of oneself 
Health education has been soundly criticised for taking biomedically accurate 
information (such as that provided by RCTs) and assuming that if lay people 
are provided with this information, and think rationally, they will act 
appropriately (e.g., Campbell, 2004a). From a pragmatist point of view, the 
key issue is that biomedical knowledge is often not very useful or actionable in 
relation to the needs of lay people. In situations where people have been 
diagnosed with a chronic illness, meanings, as much as facts, comprise useful 
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knowledge (Crossley, 2000a; Krause, 2003). An illness can change the 
meaning of a person’s life, their relationships, their work, and their very self. In 
creating their health identities, lay people may draw on medical, non-medical, 
or even anti-medical knowledge (Fox & Ward, 2006). Accordingly, service 
users have needs for knowledge much broader than biomedical knowledge. 
While RCTs provide service users with important information about 
appropriate medical treatments, they offer few resources for the tasks of 
making sense of illness and forging a new identity.  
 
Even for relatively clearly defined objectives, such as protecting sexual health, 
giving up smoking, or exercising, actionable knowledge often comes in the 
form of strategies and skills, not medical facts (Lyles et al., 2007). For 
example, role play may be used to develop young people’s sexual negotiation 
skills, so that they are equipped with interpersonal skills and discursive 
strategies enabling them to deal with situations where they feel under 
pressure to have unprotected sex (Laub et al., 1999). At meetings of 
Alcoholics Anonymous, people actively share strategies for avoiding alcohol 
consumption (Makela et al., 1996). They suggest to each other to avoid 
certain social situations, to avoid certain friends, and to make sure that 
wherever they go, there are alternatives to alcohol. They also practice how to 
decline an offer of an alcoholic drink. In both of these examples the type of 
knowledge produced through RCTs takes a backseat, and instead it is 
everyday knowledge and social skills that prove to be most useful and 
enabling.  The proliferation of service user groups and survivor groups is 
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testament to the importance of such practical knowledge, and one role for 
health research could be to support the construction of such knowledge.  
 
What methodologies would health researchers employ to serve the practical 
interests of lay people or service users? Such research might begin with 
people’s experiences and perspectives. Analytic procedures such as 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and narrative analysis (Crossley, 
2000b) can help researchers to distil strategies, narratives, and heuristics 
which have proven useful. Strategies, narratives, and heuristics are not true or 
false. They are resources which can be offered because they have worked for 
some people in the past. Alternatively, action research may be used to create 
new strategies or transform service provision to better reflect the needs of 
users (Krause, 2003). RCTs, on the other hand, are not designed to discover 
or promote skills or strategies. This is not to say that RCTs are wrong’ or 
oppressive, but that the answer to different interests.  
 
Knowledge for intervention design  
Health intervention designers face challenges of implementation. They have 
to work with the complex, real-world, everyday practicalities of individuals and 
communities, where familial, financial, political, cultural and social dimensions 
are deeply entwined with health behaviour and outcomes. Programme 
success often depends, not only on the evidence base of the intervention, but 
also upon skills of ensuring acceptability to service users, commitment from 
healthcare workers, and support of managers or powerful local stakeholders 
(Campbell, 2004b; Cornish & Ghosh, 2007). RCTs may offer some confidence 
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that a chosen method has worked in the past, but a new context will produce 
uncertainties, obstacles, exceptions and dilemmas that have to be managed. 
We cannot expect to map out every single condition that programme 
designers might encounter, in an ever-changing social and historical context, 
and create an exhaustive RCT-backed decision tree. Rather, what 
programme designers need is generative, adaptive and flexible knowledge to 
guide them through novel situations. Theories and models can provide such 
flexible knowledge. Richly detailed case studies can support the development 
of context-sensitive expertise and skilled decision-making (Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
 
One example of useful knowledge for furthering the interests of practitioners 
of community mobilisation is Paulo Freire’s (1970) theory of conscientisation. 
The ‘truth’ of this theory has never been tested by an RCT, and is not 
amenable to such a test. As a complex social intervention, conscientisation is 
not equivalent to a ‘treatment’ to be evaluated. The theory provides a general 
orientation to working with communities that can be interpreted, to fit with the 
local context, and its utility has been confirmed by its successful usage in a 
great variety of settings around the world. A good model can work in a similar 
fashion, and Alcoholics Anonymous again provides an example, whose 
success has been facilitated by clear, user-friendly guidelines for the 
establishment and running of new groups, provided in the ‘Twelve Traditions’, 
and ‘Twelve Steps’, detailed in ‘The Big Book’ (Alcoholics Anonymous, 2007). 
For those who implement interventions, theories, models, and guidelines 
encapsulate practical experience and facilitate the design and modification of 
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projects. Such practical and theoretical knowledge cannot simply be 
evaluated at a low level on a one-dimensional hierarchy of evidence.  
Knowledge for cultural critique 
Finally, research may serve a broader cultural interest of stimulating new 
interests. Considering knowledge as constitutive of our problems and 
possibilities (rather than as a ‘mirror of nature’), a pragmatist perspective 
values research activity which creates new ways of thinking and acting and 
thus creating a richer future (Rorty, 1999). As Biesta (2007) explains, in his 
pragmatist critique of demands for ‘evidence-based practice’ in education, 
RCTs are investigations of alternative means to pre-defined ends, but they do 
not problematise the chosen ends, or envisage new possible ends to pursue.  
 
For health research, the ends are usually defined in terms of health outcomes, 
but increasing recognition is being given to competing ends, such as equality, 
dignity, tradition, quality of life, and ethical principles. Biesta (2007) gives the 
example of feminist theory, which has created new awareness of gender and 
opened up new important issues and problems, for educators and healthcare 
workers (e.g. Wilkinson & Kitzinger, 1994). Likewise, research on health 
inequalities (Wilkinson, 1996) highlights an interest in ensuring that the impact 
of health programmes is evenly distributed through the diverse groups in 
society. Feminism and the ideal of equity in health cannot be subjected to 
RCTs. Rather, these are guiding theoretical ideas which give expression to 
societal values.  
 
 18 
What sorts of methods produce ideas for ‘what might be’ rather than ‘what is’? 
Comparative methods, such as Foucault’s genealogical method (e.g. 
Foucault, 1967), help to problematise current assumptions. The value of such 
work, it has been argued, is not so much its accurate portrayal of other 
cultures or other times, but its creation of a new point for reflection upon the 
present (Baert, 2003), enabling critique of the present and suggesting future 
possibilities. For the work of developing new theories or lines of inquiry, 
Feyerabend (1973) suggests that methodological proceduralism may be less 
useful than imagination. Democracy, the welfare state and universal health 
care were ideas explored through literature and fictive utopias before they 
were instituted in reality.  
 
Our argument that there are multiple interests that may be served by health 
research leads us to reject the idea of an absolute hierarchy of evidence. 
Since there is no objective way of ordering our different interests into an 
eternal hierarchy, no method is intrinsically better than another, though 
methods may be better than others in relation to particular interests. If 
supporting service users’ practical needs, or aiding intervention designers, or 
imagining alternative societal arrangements were prioritised, then theory-
building or insightful qualitative analyses might be considered the ‘gold 
standard’, and RCTs a technical necessity, useful for deciding between 
comparable alternatives, but silent on the major questions. Although pluralist, 
pragmatism is not epistemologically relativist, since knowledge can always be 
evaluated in terms of whether it succeeds in serving a specific interest or not.  
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Choosing interests: Useful for which end? 
Emphasising the diversity of interests may help to clarify the usefulness of 
different methods for different ends, but pragmatism, as described thus far, 
does not determine which of these many interests our research should 
advance. An individual interest might be at odds with a collective interest, as 
when a public health measure such as a ban on smoking in public places 
interferes with an individual’s choice to smoke. Or an interest in fund-raising to 
provide better services for disabled children, and thus portraying the children 
as needy, may be at odds with an interest in de-stigmatising disability. If Truth 
is not the objective of our knowledge-making, how are we to know which 
interest our research should advance? Rather than identifying the content of 
the interests to pursue, what we need are means of collectively deciding 
between the variety of interests at stake. We will suggest three means that 
health researchers might use to inform their choice of interests to pursue.  
Tackle problems defined by people’s experience  
The first suggestion is that we should take our direction from concrete 
problems in society. Pragmatism gives priority to people’s everyday 
experience. As Rorty (1999, p. xxii) writes, for pragmatists, human inquiry is 
‘an attempt to serve transitory purposes and solve transitory problems.’ If 
somebody experiences a problem, we need have no doubt that this is a real 
problem. We do not need big ultimate Truths in order to know what is valuable 
to pursue, we just need to listen to people’s problems of living, and valid lines 
of inquiry will open up (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This approach is well 
established in approaches such as Participatory Action Research and 
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Community Psychology, which pay careful attention to the perspectives and 
priorities of local people, and seek to address them. For example, Fryer and 
Fagan (2003), in their work with members of a community with high levels of 
unemployment, poverty and psychological distress, were guided by 
unemployed people’s reports that their core problems were financial, rather 
than being guided by abstract academic hypotheses about psychological 
impacts of unemployment. Consequently, their research and action worked to 
address the community’s financial problems and access to benefits. Taking 
people’s problems as the starting point is not a soft option for a researcher. 
Their work faces the most stringent pragmatist criterion: whether it makes a 
difference to those problems in practice.  
 
Choose problems through public deliberation  
The second means for choosing problems relies on democratic debate. 
Although Rorty (1999) is adamant that pragmatism does not lead necessarily 
to any particular definition of the good, and can as easily be put to dictatorial 
as to democratic ends, it is notable that most pragmatist philosophers 
(including Dewey, Mead, and Rorty himself) are inclined towards democracy, 
liberalism, diversity, and tolerance. This is surely related to the anti-
foundationalism of pragmatism. As Miller (2004, p.248) puts it: ‘pragmatists 
think that democracy is special in that it is the only belief that does not rest 
upon the idea that life must be subjected to some universal standard or 
preemptory authority that takes priority over every lived moment.’ Even if all of 
our knowledge is perspectival and not absolute, shaped for humans in their 
diversity, we still have to live together and to forge collective actions. Inclusive 
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public deliberation is the best means we have developed for identifying 
collective problems and planning collective action (Habermas, 1989; Rorty, 
1999). Increasing attention to the participation of service users in health 
service decision-making gives greater opportunities for public deliberation 
over appropriate action.  
 
Many health-related decisions call for public deliberation, such as questions 
about the appropriateness of stem cell research, or equality in the provision of 
health services, or genetic testing (Gaskell, 2004). No scientist or philosopher 
can provide a ‘correct’ answer to these issues. Health outcomes may compete 
with other ends such as equality, dignity or tradition. For instance, we might 
know that reducing contact with tuberculosis patients limits the spread of the 
infection, but this fact cannot determine whether closing international borders 
to people with TB is acceptable. Mediating between these contrasting frames 
for what is good is an activity for public deliberation. Likewise, at a more local 
level, participation of service users and communities in debate about health 
service provision ensures that experiential, local problems are on the agenda, 
and that locally appropriate solutions are generated – rather than these being 
determined by a single authority. 
Critique the choice of interests being served  
The third suggestion concerns the on-going necessity for critique of the 
interests served by all knowledge. Supported by the discourse of ‘evidence-
based practice’ and ‘evidence-based policy’, scientific knowledge is called 
upon as the basis for decisions about priorities and allocation of resources 
(Biesta, 2007). Neo-liberal economic knowledge plays an important role in 
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society’s understanding of itself (Nafstad et al., 2007), including decision-
making about health services (Pollock, 2004). Each different form of 
knowledge comes with assumptions about the way society works, is produced 
by certain social groups, and advances certain interests at the expense of 
others. From a pragmatist point of view, knowledge is never ‘disinterested’. 
For knowledge to be worth pursuing, it will be in the interest of those who are 
using that knowledge. Accordingly, it is essential to question which interests 
are being addressed and which disregarded or undermined.  
 
A critical perspective in health is often associated with an anti-biomedical 
stance. But the pragmatist perspective reminds us that biomedical knowledge 
serves the everyday interests of patients when it cures an illness, relieves 
symptoms, or helps a person to avoid a serious medical condition. For certain 
health issues, biomedical knowledge is extremely useful knowledge, and 
faced with a serious medical condition, many patients and their families will 
prioritise interests in physical wellbeing over other interests such as equity, 
identity, or meaning. Pragmatism does not prioritise any of these interests at 
the outset, but critically analyses which interests are served in a particular 
situation by the application of a particular kind of knowledge.  
Conclusion  
Our aim, in this article, has been to introduce a pragmatist way of 
conceptualising and evaluating the knowledge which health psychologists 
produce and encounter. We began with the question of whether research can 
be pluralist about knowledge, but at the same time non-relativist and promote 
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positive social action. We have tried to show that a pragmatist approach can 
have each of these three characteristics. 
 
Firstly, pragmatism is deeply pluralist, recognising the validity of a variety of 
interests, perspectives, and forms of knowledge. Being anti-essentialist and 
anti-foundationalist, pragmatists are suspicious of any effort to privilege a 
single point of view. As we have argued, RCTs provide crucial information 
about the relative efficacy of specific interventions. This value in no way 
undermines the position that ethnographic case studies provide rich 
understandings of the social dynamics of a community health intervention, or 
that action research develops sophisticated practical knowledge of social 
change processes. The pragmatist position is that these methods are not in 
competition with each other, because each serves a different purpose.  
 
Secondly, pragmatism’s pluralism does not result in epistemological or moral 
relativism. Viewing knowledge as a tool that brings us into a more or less 
satisfactory relation with the world, knowledge can be evaluated for whether it 
works for us in relation to a particular goal or interest. Human interests, from a 
realist point of view, are considered to taint knowledge, making it somehow 
less true. From a pragmatist point of view, human interests are not the enemy 
of productive inquiry but the key to making our inquiry productive and useful, 
providing the criteria against which knowledge can be judged. Making moral 
choices among these interests, is a social and political activity, which should 
include critical assessment of the interests served.  
 
 24 
Thirdly, pragmatism is a thoroughly action-focused perspective. Believing that 
the grounding for our knowledge is in concrete human activity, pragmatists do 
not accept solely intellectual arguments about concepts dissociated from their 
practical base. If the ideas are worth having and worth discussing, 
pragmatists argue, they must make a concrete difference for action (Peirce, 
1878). The most stringent test of ideas is whether they work in practice, and 
so pragmatist health research would prioritise the creation and evaluation of 
workable and useful intervention programmes.  
 
These three characteristics demonstrate the distinctiveness of the pragmatist 
perspective for health research. The major contribution of pragmatism is to 
bring some clarity to debates over method, by suggesting that methods, and 
knowledge, should be judged, not absolutely according to a ‘hierarchy of 
evidence’, but according to how well they serve specific interests. This brings 
the user of research – whether academic, health professional, activist or 
service user – to the fore in the evaluation of knowledge. Knowledge is to be 
evaluated according to whether it has useful consequences for the user’s 
desired action. The criterion of usefulness is then tempered by the critical 
analysis of which interests are being served by that action. 
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